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Abstract—Traditional regulatory methods for spectrum licens-
ing have been recently identified as one of the causes for the
under-utilization of the valuable radio spectrum. Governmental
agencies such as the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
are seeking ways to remove stringent regulatory barriers and
facilitate broader access to the spectrum resources. The goal is
to allow for an improved and ubiquitous sharing of the precious
radio spectrum between commercial service providers.
In this paper, we propose a novel noncooperative game theo-
retic approach, to show how to foster more sharing of the radio
spectrum via the use of regulatory power. We define a two stage
game in which the government regulators move first, followed by
the providers. The providers are incentivized by lower spectrum
allocation fees from the regulators in return for proof-of-sharing.
The providers are offered discounted spectrum bands, potentially
at different locations, but will be asked to provide coverage
to users that are not subscribed to them so as to maintain
their subsidy incentives from the government. In a simplification
of the model, analytical expressions for the providers’ perfect
equilibrium strategies are derived, and we argue for the existence
of the government’s part of a perfect equilibrium. Our analysis
shows that through subsidization, the government can provide
small service providers a fair chance to compete with the large
providers, thereby avoiding monopolization in the market.
Index Terms—noncooperative game; perfect Nash equilibrium;
spectrum sharing; subsidy markets.
I. INTRODUCTION
W ITH the continuous increase in mobile traffic, usersand mobile communication services are facing the
problem of spectrum shortages. An 11-fold increase in global
mobile data traffic is expected between 2013 and 2018 [1].
Governments around the world are trying to find ways in
which more spectrum can be made available not only for
mobile use, but also for other services that involve the use of
wireless broadband technologies such as weather forecast and
surveillance [2]. Moreover, wireless networking technologies
are becoming a more critical platform for disaster manage-
ment and public safety applications, which mandates better
communications and interoperability by effectively exploiting
under-utilized spectrum resources following a disaster [3].
Conceptualizing the next generation cellular technology shows
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that improvement in the spectrum regulations will become a
critical consideration to meet the future traffic demands [4].
Developing an efficient spectrum policy and new regulations
regarding spectrum use are essential in this day and age. Every
three years, representatives and delegates from many nations
get together to discuss the future of spectrum policies and ways
to make spectrum use more efficient and equitable. The World
Radio communication Conference (WRC), supported by the
United Nations, is usually held in the International Telecom-
munication Union (ITU) head-quartered in Geneva [5].
The main issue and challenge ahead is to create additional
spectrum capacity. Regulators have three policy directions
to increase the spectrum capacity: (i) increasing availability
and access to radio spectrum for wireless broadband via
allocating additional spectrum; (ii) reassigning spectrum to
new users; and (iii) opening up spectrum for unlicensed
use. Other policy options that may be employed to increase
spectrum capacity include: (i) sharing the wireless network
infrastructure; (ii) changing the cost structure of spectrum
access; (iii) moving to more spectrum-efficient technologies;
and (iv) sharing spectrum. Most of these approaches involve
sharing the spectrum or infrastructure resources. In the United
States, FCC and NTIA are investing in the projects of spectrum
sharing between Federal and non-Federal users as a means to
increase spectrum capacity while increasing its efficiency as
well [6]. For example, T-Mobile USA is currently sharing its
spectrum with federal agencies [7].
A major impediment for pervasive spectrum sharing is the
providers’ tendency to protect the bands that they procured
with extensive licensing and operating costs. Current spectrum
usage heavily follows competitive auctions [8] which are
healthy for balancing standardization trends [9], but may
hinder the potential gains that can be obtained via extensive
sharing [10], [11]. The traditional spectrum policies which
are prevailing in the last few decades were developed with
a motivation to minimize harmful interference between the
operators. However, the optimum spectrum policy is not to
just eliminate the interference, rather to jointly optimize the
total functionality, economic and societal benefits of all radio
systems [12]. Current broadband policies [13] dictate that
competitive auctions must remain intact, while simultaneously
incorporating elements of spectrum sharing and new ways
to manage spectrum usage. Such governance and policies
welcoming the necessary economic tools for enabling hetero-
geneous spectrum sharing for the larger good are imperative.
One promising approach to foster more sharing of the
spectrum is via the use of regulatory power. In fact, the
National Broadband Plan [13] recommends the wide-spread
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2development of the concept of spectrum subsidy, e.g., licensing
of the D block for commercial use if public safety partnerships
are considered by the licensee. In this paper, we investigate this
idea of subsidizing the spectrum to the providers with lower
costs in return of proof-of-sharing. Thus, the providers will
be offered discounted spectrum bands, potentially at different
locations, but will be asked to cover users not subscribed
to them so as to maintain their subsidy incentives from the
government. Recent studies suggest significant market and
user welfare gains under such subsidization, e.g., data subsidy
for offering minimal data plan to users for free [14] or
spectrum pooling among providers to improve user experience
[10]. However, using game theory to analyze a subsidized
spectrum market, that considers spatial and temporal provider-
government relationships as well as dynamic components
like roaming, and signal quality, is essentially unexplored. In
this paper, we contribute a spectrum sharing framework that
considers these aspects all at once in a noncooperative game.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
summarizes the existing works on spectrum sharing in the
literature. Section III outlines the contributions of this paper.
Section IV presents a spectrum market between government,
providers, and customers, and also highlights some key ob-
servations. In Section V, we describe this market as a non-
cooperative game, defining precisely the notion of perfect
Nash equilibrium. In Section VI, we formulate the multi-
criteria maximization problem for the providers’ part of the
perfect equilibrium, in a simplified case of two providers
and two regions; in Section VII, we derive approximation to
that equilibrium. There, we argue that in our specific case
an “entire” perfect equilibrium exists (including a regulatory
strategy for the government). In Section VIII, we analyze
the results and provide insights into the subsidization model.
There, we also show our simulations based on best response
algorithm to converge to the equilibrium. Section IX concludes
the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Regulatory practice has been part of the wireless market
since its inception as the resource being shared was soon rec-
ognized to be very valuable. Governmental agencies establish
regulatory policies to increase the efficiency of the spectrum
market while preserving an acceptable level of fairness in
sharing the precious spectrum. The concept of subsidization is
one way to involve the government so as to incentivize various
long-term goals in the market being regulated. Typically,
subsidy regulations are used for markets serving “the larger
good” (i.e., the benefit of the whole society) and involving a
significant amount of cost producers cannot bare individually.
Transportation [15], agriculture [16] and telecommunications
[17] are examples of such markets where new initiatives
require significant infrastructure investments, and hence the
government’s involvement is justified. However, subsidization
is known to have negative effects on the efficiency of the
market. Thus, performance-based subsidization is preferred if
at all possible.
Even though subsidization is heavily employed in several
markets, the wireless market has not seen much of its usage
beyond a few, limited scenarios. The most known subsidization
in a wireless market is the subsidization of the expensive
phones to the users by the provider [18], in that the user pays
the phone’s cost over a locked, termed contract. Unlocking the
contract term either requires return of the phone or payment
of a significant fee.
Only recently, Yu and Kim [14] focused on the concept
of using subsidies for spectrum management. Their work
analyzed price and quality of service (QoS) subsidy schemes
to increase the utility of the consumers from the data plans.
The goal is to increase the availability of wireless data plans to
more users. In their model, the regulator offers a subsidized
(i.e., less expensive) data plan to the end users with lower
quality of service via subsidization to the providers. In our
work, we consider subsidizing the spectrum to the providers
and focus on implementing a subsidy system mainly between
the providers and the government. We aim to make the
subsidization seamless to the end users and aim to incentivize
the providers to be more welcoming to the users subscribed to
other providers. As a major difference, we focus on spectrum
subsidy rather than data plan subsidy.
A related concept to the subsidization approach considered
in this paper is inter-operator roaming. Through roaming, a
customer can make/receive calls and send/receive data while
outside of the home network coverage, by using the infrastruc-
ture of another provider. This is enabled through reciprocal
roaming charges among operators, which may vary, e.g., de-
pending on the nationwide coverage supported by an operator
through its infrastructure. The new roaming regulations in
European Union (EU) to be effective from December 2015
will no longer allow the telecom providers to charge extra
roaming costs to their customers [19]. The goal is to facilitate
competition in the roaming market and bring international
roaming prices down to domestic rates, e.g., through diversity
of market players, low barriers to market entry, and equal
access to basic wholesale services. The analysis in [20] shows
that, as long as certain coverage conditions are fulfilled,
providers in an open system (where roaming is allowed) have
strictly better revenues when compared to a closed system
with no roaming. Benefits of inter-operator spectrum sharing
and joint radio resource management (JRRM) have also been
demonstrated in recent works [21]–[23]. The inter-operator
JRRM technique proposed in [21] allows subscribers to get
service through other operators in case the home operator net-
work is blocked, and results show that inter-operator roaming
agreements improve both the network performance and the
operators’ revenue.
In [22], a roaming market model is introduced, which uses
the roaming rate as an incentive for service providers to gain
revenue, when they allow other users to access their network.
Optimal roaming rate is derived to maximize the social welfare
of all the service providers and licensed users. Our approach
for subsidization, while also allows inter-operator sharing of
spectrum similar to roaming, is fundamentally different than
these earlier work, since it involves the government as the
subsidy source to facilitate spectrum sharing.
Recently, dynamic spectrum sharing has been gaining inter-
est where the service providers can buy additional channel
3bands to meet their customer demands or can sell their
underutilized spectrum to gain an additional revenue. To this
end, there are several works in the literature which are based
on auctions for the secondary spectrum access [24]–[26]. Typ-
ically, there exists a spectrum broker who divides the available
spectrum into channels and allocates them to the competing
providers using an auction mechanism. Determining a proper
auction mechanism is of importance in this method. In [24], a
generalized Branco’s auction mechanism is introduced which
aims at maximizing the profit to the seller, while in [25],
a truthful auction mechanism is proposed which aims at
maximizing the social welfare or the revenue of the seller.
In [26], a knapsack-based auction mechanism is proposed for
dynamically allocating the spectrum in the coordinated access
band. Another set of works [27]–[29] in the literature deals
with the issues of spectrum pricing when the primary license
holder wants to lease the spectrum to a secondary operator.
Even though dynamic spectrum sharing improves the spec-
trum utilization efficiency, there are few downsides that affect
the network operators. Spectrum sharing agreements while
provide the operators an alternative means of meeting their
bandwidth demands, they may also encourage them to under-
invest in their infrastructure. Such trade-offs have been inves-
tigated in [23] considering two different sharing models. Fur-
thermore, when a primary license holder leases his spectrum
within a sub-region to a secondary operator, it results into a
reduced spatial coverage of the primary operator’s network,
and also possible interference from the secondary operator.
This trade-off is studied in [29]. Our proposal can coexist with
such dynamic sharing schemes since it can be orthogonal to
the dynamic sharing deals among providers.
III. CONTRIBUTIONS
In the context of the other related work discussed in
Section II, the main contributions of this paper are to model
a subsidization framework using an extensive form game, and
to show how to find (perfect) equilibrium solutions for (a
simple case of) the game. The players in the game are a finite
number of service providers plus a single government player.
[Customers are not formal players in our game as their actions
are completely determined by the moves of the providers and
the government.] The government incentivizes the providers
to give service to the foreign customers who are outside the
coverage of their home provider. The providers each aim to
maximize their profit from enrolling customers, by efficiently
investing the subsidies received from the government. A cus-
tomer’s utility depends upon the level of service obtained from
its ”home provider”. The government attempts to maximize
social welfare, here measured as the sum of the customers’
utilities.
Initially, with preliminary observations of the game theoretic
framework, we provide insights into the effects of subsidiza-
tion on the service providers and the customers. However, due
to the complexity of the problem, we cannot obtain closed
form expressions for the equilibrium solutions. For this reason,
we consider a simple, yet insightful case of two providers and
two regions. Here, we derive an approximation to part of the
Government 
Provider 1 Provider 2 Provider 𝑗 … 
Provider 𝑗 
base station 
Provider 1 
base station 
Provider 2 
base station 
Neighbor 
Device 
Region 𝒌 
… 
… 
Region 𝒌 − 𝟏 Region 𝒌 + 𝟏 
𝜉1 
𝑝 𝒪𝒞1  𝜉1 
𝜉2 𝜉𝑗 𝑝 𝒪𝒞2  𝜉2 
𝑝 𝒪𝒞𝑗  𝜉𝑗 
𝑠1𝑘 
𝑅1𝑘 𝑠2𝑘 
𝑠𝑗𝑘 𝑅2𝑘 
𝑅𝑗𝑘 
𝜓𝑘𝑖1 
𝑓𝑗 𝜓𝑘𝑖2 
𝜓𝑘𝑖𝑗 
Fig. 1. Model for a subsidized spectrum market. In this model, government
allocates subsidy ξj to provider j, which in return can utilize a portion sjk
of it to improve the service quality (which is captured by ψkij ) in region k.
Provider j charges fee fj to each of its customers and as a result collects a
revenue Rjk from region k.
equilibrium solution using a heuristic approach. We check the
accuracy of the approximation by comparing its results with
the numerical equilibrium solutions. Since exact expressions to
the equilibrium solutions could not be derived, the existence of
Nash equilibrium could not be proved analytically. However,
we argue that our analysis implies this existence at least for
some particular parameter values.
IV. A SPECTRUM MARKET WITH SUBSIDY
Even though there are several works in the literature on
the role of government in market formations [30], [31], the
government’s regulatory role in the radio spectrum market has
not been explored well within a game-theoretic framework. We
propose a spectrum market model with three types of agents as
shown in Fig. 1: customers, providers, and a single government
player. A list of all the notations used in our model appears in
Table I. The customers are essentially the end-user devices that
will ultimately engage in localized spectrum sharing markets.
Let I = {1, ..., I} be the set of wireless customers. These
customers are spread out over a set of regions K = {1, ...,K}.
We assume there are nk customers in region k, k = 1, ...,K.
If ki is the region in which customer i is located, we call
ki its home region. Each customer i makes βi calls in its
home region (over the time period associated with the game);
for simplicity we assume βi is equal to a constant β for all
i. In addition, we assume the customers each make α calls
outside their home region. To choose its main service provider,
customer i takes as given the “intensity of service/signal” ψkij
offered by each provider j in region ki, as well as the fee fj
that each j charges for service. This is done probabilistically
as described below.
4The set of all providers is denoted by J = {1, ..., J}.
Providers operate in all regions. The government gives each
provider an allotment of bandwidth and of monetary subsidy,
which they, in turn, allocate for their own use in each of the
K regions. The amount of bandwidth and money spent in
each region determines the intensity of service offered, which
in turn helps determine who wins customer subscriptions.
An important feature of this model is that the government
motivates the providers to give service to customers who are
outside of their home region (i.e., roaming) or simply far
away from the base stations of their home providers. Foreign
providers might be able to provide a higher intensity signal
than the customers’ home providers. The government aims to
motivate foreign providers by reducing each provider’s subsidy
if the provider does not service enough number of foreign
customers who are away from their home providers.
We propose a two-stage, extensive form noncooperative
game in which the government moves first, followed by
the providers (all simultaneously). Here, the customers are
not formal players in the game because their actions are
completely determined by the actions of the other players.
Mathematically, we would like to solve for a perfect Nash
equilibrium in the game as follows: a) Knowing what the
customers will do as a function of {ψkij}i,j and {fj}Jj=1,
we can solve for the optimal strategy for the providers; b)
Knowing how the providers/customers behave, we can solve
the governments problem, which would be to maximize social
welfare – which in this case would be the total of customers’
utility from consuming the wireless spectrum.
A. Customer i’s Problem
Each customer i has the same increasing concave utility
function u for intensity of wireless service, expressed in units
of money per call. Thus
Uj(ki) = βu(ψkij)− fj (1)
measures the utility a customer would get from local calls in its
home region ki, if the customer chose provider j as its home
provider. The customer then chooses provider j (j = 1, ..., J)
with probability
Pj(ki) =
Uj(ki)∑J
j′=1 Uj′(ki)
. (2)
This probabilistic assignment of contracts (prizes) to providers
(contestants) based on resources offered is taken from Contest
Theory, and arises in many applications (see, e.g., [32], [33],
or the excellent survey paper of [34]).
We note that the customers choose the providers based
only upon offered service in their home regions, because their
outside calls will always be covered (at no extra cost to them)
as a result of the government’s subsidization scheme.
B. Provider j’s Problem
Provider j has at its disposal a total amount of cash Ej+ξj ,
where Ej is the amount of cash on hand at the beginning of
the game, and ξj is the amount of subsidy it receives from
the government. They also are allocated bandwidth Bj from
TABLE I
NOTATIONS AND SYMBOLS
Symbol Description
I Total number of customers
J Total number of providers
K Total number of regions
nk Number of customers in region k
β Number of calls made by a customer in its home
region
α Number of outside calls a customer makes
ki The region where customer i is located
fj The fee charged by provider j to its customers
ψkj The intensity/quality of provider j’s signal in
region k
Q(.) An increasing concave function used to calcu-
late ψkj – parameterized with the investment,
sjk, and/or bandwidth, bjk, in a region
u(.) Customers’ utility function – parameterized
with received signal intensity ψkj
Uj(k) The utility obtained by choosing provider j in
region k
Pj(k) The probability that provider j is chosen in
region k
Rjk Provider j’s revenue collected from region k
sjk Portion of the subsidy amount provider j des-
ignates/spends in region k
Ej Cash on hand for provider j, before obtaining
any subsidy
ξj Subsidy amount provider j receives from the
government
ξ Total subsidy budget of the government
OCj Number of outside calls provider j serves
p(.) Penalty function determining the proportion of
the subsidy to be returned to the government –
parameterized with OCj
δ Per-outside-call reward to the provider from the
government
γ Scaling factor in the customer utility function
the government. Their problem is to allocate these resources
among the regions, designating sjk to spend in region k and
bandwidth bjk to use in region k, k = 1, ...,K. The intensity
of service that it offers in region k is then
ψkj = Q(sjk, bjk), (3)
where Q is an exogenously given function (increasing and
concave). In other words, the service intensity monotonically
increases with the cash invested by the provider, as well as
the utilized bandwidth. Provider j also sets the fee fj which
all of its contracted customers in all regions must pay.
From the description of the customers’ problem above, we
see that provider j will capture nkPj(k) of the customers in
region k, for a revenue of
Rjk = fjnkPj(k), (4)
5where Pj(k) is defined in (2). Then their total revenue (across
all regions) is
∑K
k=1Rjk.
Next, we note that the customers in region kˆ make αnkˆ
calls outside of their home region. We assume
nkˆk =
αnkˆnk∑
k′ 6=kˆ nk′
(5)
of these occur in region k (k 6= kˆ). These calls will be allocated
probabilistically to the providers, according to the intensity
levels offered by the providers in region k. The total number
of such outside calls that provider j serves is then
OCj =
K∑
k=1
∑
kˆ 6=k
nkˆk
u(ψkj)∑J
j′=1 u(ψkj′)
. (6)
The provider is then assessed a penalty according to this
number – the lower the quantity OCj is, the higher the penalty.
The penalty is expressed as a proportion of subsidy lost, and is
incurred after the market. So, assuming this penalty function
is denoted p(x), we can write down an optimization problem
for provider j:
max
{sjk},{bjk},fj
K∑
k=1
Rjk+(1− p(OCj))ξj −
K∑
k=1
sjk (7)
such that,
K∑
k=1
sjk ≤Ej + ξj , (8)
K∑
k=1
bjk =Bj , (9)
ψkj =Q(sjk, bjk), (10)
sjk, bjk, fj ≥0, ∀ j, k, (11)
where the first term in the maximization is the total revenue,
the second term is the leftover subsidy money after the
penalty is deducted due to fewer-than-required sharing of the
provider’s spectrum, and the last term is the total amount of
expenses the provider uses from the subsidy it received from
the government.
C. Government’s Problem
Finally, the government’s decision variables are ξj and Bj ,
j = 1, ..., J . It also can designate the function p(x) described
above. Its objective is to maximize social welfare, here defined
as the customers’ total utility from wireless service, which is
max
{ξj ,Bj}Jj=1
[
I∑
i=1
βu(ψkij(i))
+
J∑
j=1
K∑
k=1
∑
kˆ 6=k
nkˆk u(ψkj)∑J
j′=1 u(ψkj′)
u(ψkj)
 (12)
s.t.,
J∑
j=1
Bj = B, (13)
j∑
j=1
ξj ≤ ξ, (14)
Bj , ξj ≥ 0 ∀j. (15)
Here, the first term is the utility that customers acquire in their
home regions, while the second term is from calls in outside
regions. The notation j(i) is the home provider to which
customer i is assigned. The quantities B and ξ represent the
total amounts of bandwidth and subsidy that the government
has at its disposal to allocate.
D. Observations and Discussion
The model we have just outlined, while not perfectly
covering all details and aspects, provides a good framework to
consider the viability of subsidizing spectrum to providers in
return for increased spectrum sharing. The providers constitute
a key player to scrutinize in such a spectrum market model.
Ultimately, the goal of this market model is to motivate the
providers to share their spectrum among each other to attain
the larger good of serving more customers with better quality
access links.
Provider j’s problem (7) offers several insights. The first
term in (7) is the fees provider j collects from its home
customers, who are subscribed to provider j. Provider j has to
serve these customers by default. But when these customers
travel to other regions, they may be able to find another
provider that offers a better quality signal at that location.
In that case, those customers would be considered as making
an outside call, and thus contributing to the sharing of the
spectrum among the providers.
The second term in (7) describes the amount of subsidy
money left to provider j. This leftover amount is dependent on
the subsidy amount, ξj , given by the government to provider
j, and more importantly, the number of outside calls, OCj ,
served by provider j during the subsidy term. If OCj is not
large enough, provider j may have to return all of the subsidy
back to the government. At the other extreme, provider j may
keep all of the subsidy amount, ξj , if it did serve sufficient
number of foreign customers.
The third term in (7) quantifies the sum of investments
provider j makes from its subsidy. Provider j can choose
which regions to invest more. It can further decide whether to
spend all of the subsidy it received, ξj , from the government.
In this model, the provider takes some risk by spending the
subsidy money. It needs to wisely decide on which regions
to invest. The ideal situation for the provider is to invest into
those regions in which more outside calls become possible
to serve. This will motivate the providers to invest into more
congested areas and thus serve the larger goal of improving
user-perceived link quality.
Observation 1: Providers cannot be hurt by the subsidization
option.
A provider (say j) does not have to take the subsidization
option if it will not generate any profits. If j does not
participate in the subsidization plan, then the government
cannot penalize it for not serving the required number of
outside calls and therefore the revenue generated from the
provider’s own investment Ej will remain intact.
6Observation 2: Providers can easily be motivated into a
subsidized market.
The government can offer a large ξj and a conservative (i.e.,
not heavily penalizing) penalty function to attract the providers
into the subsidization option. Since, from Observation 1, there
is really not much of risk from the subsidization option, the
tipping point for providers to sign into subsidization contracts
will not be high. A relatively high ξj will promise a positive
return from the subsidization.
Observation 3: Providers will be motivated to invest in a non-
overlapping manner and collectively cover a larger area.
The number of outside calls OCj in (7) depends on the amount
of overlap between the network coverage areas of different
providers. Operators, by not duplicating their infrastructure in
the same areas, can minimize their investment cost sjk, while
at the same time minimizing the penalty cost (1− p(OCj))ξj
charged by the government in (7), yielding high revenues.
This observation agrees with the conclusions in [20], in which
the analysis suggests that minimization of the duplication
of network infrastructure by different providers yields higher
provider revenues.
Observation 4: As the ratio αβ increases, subsidization will
be more beneficial, particularly to those providers smaller in
size.
Suppose α increases (and β remains the same, so that the ratio
α
β increases). Then from (5) and (6), it follows that OCj will
also increase. This will in turn increase the contribution of
the second term in (7) to provider j’s revenue. An interesting
situation happens for smaller providers. Small providers serve
small regions, so their customers are more apt to leave their
home regions. Hence they make relatively more outside calls
than home calls. Hence the contribution of the second and
third term of (7) into their revenue total could be more than
the first term’s contribution.
Observation 5: Small providers will be more able to compete
with large providers as the ratio αβ increases.
This follows from Observation 4. A new note to make here
is that small providers with smaller infrastructure will be able
to compete against providers with large infrastructure as long
as α is relatively more than β. They will be able to do so by
swiftly investing into congested spots where larger providers
cannot reach well.
Observation 6: Monopolization will be avoided as long as
the ratio αβ is high.
This follows from Observations 4 and 5. As we’ve seen, under
this scenario smaller providers have the advantage. Thus, there
will be no incentive to monopolize.
V. PERFECT NASH EQUILIBRIUM
As stated previously, our game is one where the government
moves first followed by the providers. This makes sense intu-
itively, as it is natural that the government “makes the rules”
and private companies then react to them. The government
strategy is to set the subsidy amounts ξj and the bandwidths
Bj granted to each provider j. After this, each provider
simultaneously tries to maximize its utility by optimizing its
strategic variables: subsidy amounts spent in each region sjk,
bandwidth allocated in each region bjk and fee charged to
customers fj . Game theoretically, the “game tree” has two
types of subtree: the whole game itself, and also any subtree
occurring after the government makes its initial move.
In game theory, a Nash equilibrium is a set of strategies,
one for each player, with the property that: given the other
players stick to their assigned strategies, no player can gain
by unilaterally deviating from their own strategy. A perfect
Nash equilibrium is a special type of Nash equilibrium which
has this property not only with regard to the whole game, but
also if restricted (in the natural way) to any subtree of the
game.
In our game, a strategy for the government can be rep-
resented as g = {ξj , Bj}j∈J . Denote the set of all such
strategies by G. Next, a strategy for provider j ∈ J can
be represented by aj(g) = {sjk(g), bjk(g), fj(g)}k∈K. Note
that the strategies for the providers have g as an argument,
as the providers move after the government and so can base
their moves according to what the government does. Finally,
denote the strategies of all the providers collectively by the
vector a(g) = {aj(g)}j∈J .
Given the above notations, the definition of perfect Nash
equilibrium reduces to:
Definition 1: A set of strategies {a∗, g∗} constitutes a
perfect Nash equilibrium of this game, if and only if, it satisfies
the following set of inequalities:
U jp
(
a∗j (g),a
∗
−j(g), g
)
≥ U jp
(
aj(g),a
∗
−j(g), g
)
, ∀aj , j ∈ J , and g ∈ G
and UG (g∗,a∗(g∗)) ≥ UG (g,a∗(g)) ∀g ∈ G, (16)
where, a∗−j = {ai}i∈J ,i6=j , is the vector of strategies of all
the providers other than j. The function U jp is the provider j’s
utility given by the expression in maximization problem of
(7). The function UG is the government’s utility given by the
expression in maximization problem of (12).
In general, for our game the conditions (16) are too difficult
to solve analytically, or even computationally. The best we
can do is to consider a simplification of the game in which a)
there are only two regions and two providers; b) the bandwidth
variable has been taken out of the model; and c) there is a
linear penalty function. Assuming particular parameter values,
we can computationally solve for the providers’ equilibrium
strategies as a function of g; from this we argue that a perfect
Nash equilibrium must exist. See Section VII-C.
VI. A SIMPLIFIED SPECTRUM MARKET
In this section, we simplify the market model in Section IV.
In particular, we make the following simplifications:
• We assume a linear penalty function p(OCj), for which
p(0) = 1 (if a provider serves no foreign customers, it
loses all of its subsidy). It implies that the (1−p(OCj))ξj
term in (7) can be recast as a “reward function” δOCj ,
where δ is a per-outside-call reward that the government
gives to providers.
7• By eliminating the explicit handling of bandwidth and
assuming that it is implicit in the intensity function that
expresses the received signal quality on an access link.
Hence, (3) reduces to ψkj = Q(skj).
• We assume a concave (square root) utility function u,
linear signal quality function Q, and set the initial cash
holdings Ej equal to zero.
We then consider a particular case with two-regions and two-
providers to obtain closed form expressions for the providers’
part of the equilibrium solution (subsidy s∗jk and fee f
∗
j ), as
a function of the government’s strategy ξ.
A. A Linear Penalty Function
The linear penalty function described above is illustrated
in Fig. 2(a) which is a linearly decreasing function of OCj .
If provider j serves a minimum of OCj,th number of outside
calls, then the penalty to the provider will be zero. On the
(a) 
𝒪𝒞𝑗,th 
𝑝 𝒪𝒞𝑗  
1 
0 𝒪𝒞𝑗 
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𝛿 𝒪𝒞𝑗  
𝜉𝑗 
0 
Fig. 2. Illustration of (a) penalty function; (b) reward function.
other hand, the reward function illustrated in Fig. 2(b) is an
increasing function of OCj . If provider j serves a minimum
of OCj,th number of outside calls, then it would receive
complete subsidy amount ξj , which is equivalent to zero
penalty. Here, the slope of reward function is the per-outside-
call reward δ that is specified by the government. Based on the
available budget ξ and the expected number of outside calls
αI , government can determine the per-outside-call reward as
δ =
ξ
αI
=
∑J
j=1 ξj
α
∑K
k=1 nk
. (17)
Then, provider j has to serveOCj,th = ξj/δ number of outside
calls to receive the maximum reward ξj .
B. Bandwidth Implicit in the Intensity Function
As stated above, we assume ψkj = Q(skj). Using this, the
linear form for the penalty function, and the expressions (2)–
(6) and (17), we may rewrite provider j’s problem as follows:
max
sj1,sj2,...,sjK ,fj
K∑
k=1
fjnk
βu(Q(sjk))− fj∑J
j′=1 βu(Q(sj′k))− fj′
+
ξ
I
K∑
k=1
∑
kˆ 6=k
nkˆ nk∑
k′ 6=kˆ nk′
u(Q(sjk))∑J
j′=1 u(Q(sj′k))
−
K∑
k=1
sjk (18)
s.t.,
K∑
k=1
sjk ≤ Ej + ξj , (19)
sjk ≥ 0, k = 1...K, (20)
fj ≥ 0. (21)
Here, it is worthwhile to note that (18) is independent of the
parameter α due to the use of linear penalty function and the
assumption that each customer makes same number of outside
calls (i.e., α).
C. Further Simplifying Assumptions
We further make the following simplifying assumptions for
our market:
• Concave customer utility function of the form: u(x) =
γ
√
x, where γ  1 is a scaling factor.
• A linear signal quality function: Q(sjk) = sjk.
• No initial cash on hand for the providers, i.e. Ej = 0 for
all j.
In general, a concave (square-root) utility in the first assump-
tion is considered realistic enough to capture the diminishing
returns behavior of received quality. The second assumption
on linear signal quality function may be considered optimistic,
since the signal quality will also behave in a diminishing re-
turns manner as the investment on the infrastructure increases.
However, since Q(·) always feeds into u(·) in our formulation,
the u(Q(·)) will still behave according to diminishing returns.
D. Two Regions and Two Providers
To make our model more understandable, we now rewrite
the providers’ problems for the case with two providers and
two regions. All of the assumptions in Sections VI-A through
VI-C are incorporated here:
1) Provider 1’s Problem: By applying the aforementioned
simplifying assumptions into (18), the objective function of
provider 1 can be expressed as:
max
s11,s12,f1
f1n1
γβ
√
s11 − f1
γβ
√
s11 − f1 + γβ√s21 − f2
+ f1n2
γβ
√
s12 − f1
γβ
√
s12 − f1 + γβ√s22 − f2
+
ξ
I
(
n1
√
s12√
s12 +
√
s22
+ n2
√
s11√
s11 +
√
s21
)
− s11 − s12, (22)
s. t., s11 + s12 ≤ ξ1, (23)
s11, s12, f1 ≥ 0. (24)
We take the first-order conditions for the system (22)–(24) as
follows:
w.r.t. f1:
n1(γβ
√
s11 − 2f1)(γβ√s11 − f1 + γβ√s21 − f2)
+ f1n1(γβ
√
s11 − f1)
(γβ
√
s11 − f1 + γβ√s21 − f2)2
+
n2(γβ
√
s12 − 2f1)(γβ√s22 − f2 + γβ√s12 − f1)
+ f1n2(γβ
√
s12 − f1)
(γβ
√
s22 − f2 + γβ√s12 − f1)2
= 0, (25)
8w.r.t. s11:
βf1n1γ
(
γβ
√
s21 − f2
)
2
√
s11
(
γβ
√
s11 − f1 + γβ√s21 − f2
)2
+
n2ξ
√
s21
2I
(√
s21 +
√
s11
)2√
s11
− 1− λ1 = 0, (26)
w.r.t. s12:
βf1n2γ
(
γβ
√
s22 − f2
)
2
√
s12
(
γβ
√
s12 − f1 + γβ√s22 − f2
)2
+
n1ξ
√
s22
2I
(√
s12 +
√
s22
)2√
s12
− 1− λ1 = 0, (27)
and
λ1 ≥ 0, s11 + s12 = ξ1 or λ1 = 0, s11 + s12 ≤ ξ1. (28)
Here, λ1 is the Lagrangian multiplier for the constraint (23)
on the total amount of subsidization the government offers to
providers.
2) Provider 2’s Problem: The objective function of
provider 2 can be expressed as
max
s21,s22,f2
f2n1
γβ
√
s21 − f2
γβ
√
s11 − f1 + γβ√s21 − f2
+ f2n2
γβ
√
s22 − f2
γβ
√
s12 − f1 + γβ√s22 − f2
+
ξ
I
(
n1
√
s22√
s12 +
√
s22
+ n2
√
s21√
s11 +
√
s21
)
− s21 − s22, (29)
s. t., s21 + s22 ≤ ξ2, and s21, s22, f2 ≥ 0. (30)
Similar to Provider 1, Provider 2 will have to optimize w.r.t.
s21, s22, and f2. So, the first-order conditions will be:
w.r.t. f2:
n1(γβ
√
s21 − 2f2)(γβ√s11 − f1 + γβ√s21 − f2)
+ f2n1(γβ
√
s21 − f2)
(γβ
√
s11 − f1 + γβ√s21 − f2)2
+
n2(γβ
√
s22 − 2f2)(γβ√s12 − f1 + γβ√s22 − f2)
+ f2n2(γβ
√
s22 − f2)
(γβ
√
s12 − f1 + γβ√s22 − f2)2
= 0, (31)
w.r.t. s21:
βf2n1γ
(
γβ
√
s11 − f1
)
2
√
s21
(
γβ
√
s11 − f1 + γβ√s21 − f2
)2
+
n2ξ
√
s11
2I
(√
s21 +
√
s11
)2√
s21
− 1− λ2 = 0, (32)
w.r.t. s22:
βf2n2γ
(
γβ
√
s12 − f1
)
2
√
s22
(
γβ
√
s12 − f1 + γβ√s22 − f2
)2
+
n1ξ
√
s12
2I
(√
s12 +
√
s22
)2√
s22
− 1− λ2 = 0, (33)
and
λ2 ≥ 0, s21 + s22 = ξ2 or λ2 = 0, s21 + s22 ≤ ξ2, (34)
where λ2 is the Lagrangian multiplier.
VII. OPTIMAL POLICIES AND EXISTENCE OF PERFECT
NASH EQUILIBRIUM
A. Optimum Subsidy Amounts Spent (s∗jk)
Looking at the formulations of the providers’ problems
described in (22)–(34), it is clear that the problem in hand is a
multi-criteria maximization problem with (22) and (29) being
the two simultaneous objective functions. The parameters to
be optimized are the fees f1, f2, and the subsidy amounts
s11, s12, s21, s22, which are functions of the input parameters
β, n1, n2, ξ1 and ξ2. We wish to solve the eight simultaneous
equations formed by the first order conditions in (25)–(28) and
(31)–(34), to obtain closed form expressions for the optimum
parameters. Note that each parameter to be optimized depends
on the other optimization parameters. Due to high number of
unknown variables and the involved complexity while solving
these simultaneous equations (such as solving polynomials of
7th order or higher), it is impractical to derive the expressions
for optimum parameters in closed form. Hence, we derive
approximations for the optimum fee and subsidy parameters by
following a heuristic approach. In this approach, we numeri-
cally solve the simultaneous equations of (25)–(28) and (31)–
(34), and generate the plots of optimum fees to be charged
to the customers, and optimum subsidy amounts to be spent
by the providers in each region, for a wide range of input
parameters. By studying these plots, we develop expressions
for the optimum parameters by understanding the relationships
of these parameters with each of the input parameters. The
following important relationships were noted by studying the
numerical plots.
1) The subsidy amounts s∗11 and s
∗
12 spent by provider 1
in regions 1 and 2 respectively, are proportional to the
subsidy ξ1 granted to provider 1 by the government
and are independent of ξ2. Similarly, s∗21 and s
∗
22 are
proportional to ξ2 and independent of ξ1.
2) The providers each spend the entire amount of subsidy
given to them by the government. That is, s∗11+s
∗
12 = ξ1,
and s∗21 + s
∗
22 = ξ2.
3) The s∗jk’s vary non-linearly with respect to n1 and n2.
Also, when n1 = n2, we have s∗11 = s
∗
12 and s
∗
21 = s
∗
22.
The approximations for the optimum subsidy amounts that
satisfy the above mentioned points were derived via a heuristic
approach as
s∗11 ≈
ξ1
2
(
n1
n1 + n2
+
1
2
)
, (35)
s∗12 ≈
ξ1
2
(
n2
n1 + n2
+
1
2
)
, (36)
s∗21 ≈
ξ2
2
(
n1
n1 + n2
+
1
2
)
, (37)
s∗22 ≈
ξ2
2
(
n2
n1 + n2
+
1
2
)
. (38)
9The accuracy of these expressions will be verified in Sec-
tion VIII through comparisons with the numerical results.
B. Optimum Fee (f∗j )
Similar to the approach that was used to find the optimum
subsidy amounts to be spent by the providers, a heuristic
approach is used to find the optimum fees to be charged
by providers to the customers. The numerical solutions of
the optimum fees f∗1 and f
∗
2 revealed that the optimum fees
have negligible dependence on n1 and n2, as will be shown
in Section VIII. Hence, without loss of accuracy we make
an assumption that the number of users in the two regions
are the same, that is, n1 = n2 = n. Then, the providers’
objective functions can be simplified which will allow us to
mathematically derive the closed form expressions for the
optimum fee.
Theorem 1: In the simplified two-region two-provider sub-
sidization model, if the number of users in the two regions are
assumed to be same, i.e., n1 = n2 = n, then the optimum fee
f∗1 and f
∗
2 set by the two providers can be derived as
f∗1 =
γβ(7
√
s∗1 + 4
√
s∗2)
9
− 2
√
A
3
cos
(
1
3
cos−1
√
27B2
4A3
+
pi
3
)
, (39)
f∗2 =
γβ(7
√
s∗2 + 4
√
s∗1)
9
− 2
√
C
3
cos
(
1
3
cos−1
√
27D2
4C3
+
pi
3
)
, (40)
where
A =
4γ2β2
[
9
√
s∗1s
∗
2 + (
√
s∗1 − 2
√
s∗2)
2
]
27
, (41)
B =
γ3β3
272
(
16s∗1
√
s∗1 − 240s∗2
√
s∗1
− 123s∗1
√
s∗2 − 128s∗2
√
s∗2
)
, (42)
C =
4γ2β2
[
9
√
s∗2s
∗
1 + (
√
s∗2 − 2
√
s∗1)
2
]
27
, (43)
D =
γ3β3
272
(
16s∗2
√
s∗2 − 240s∗1
√
s∗2
− 123s∗2
√
s∗1 − 128s∗1
√
s∗1
)
, (44)
s∗1 = ξ1/2 and s
∗
2 = ξ2/2. (45)
Proof: See Appendix. 
C. Existence of Perfect Nash Equilibrium
In our simplified game, we now argue that the previous
results imply the existence of a perfect Nash equilibrium
(see Section V). In particular, from (35)–(45) (and from the
numerical results in Figs. 4 and 6 later in Section VIII),
we have found the optimal strategies s∗ and f∗ for the
providers, as a function of government’s strategy ξ. And these
strategies appear to be continuous functions of ξ. Hence the
government’s objective function from Section IV-C would be
a continuous function of ξ. Since that problem has a compact
domain, a basic theorem from analysis [35, Theorem 7, p. 142]
guarantees the existence of an optimum ξ∗. This ξ∗ would then
be the government’s part of the perfect Nash equilibrium.
VIII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In the previous section, a simplified model with two
providers and two regions was considered where the two
providers’ objective functions (22) and (29) were maximized
by optimizing the subsidy amounts s11, s12, s21 and s22,
and the fees f1 and f2. In this section, we first show the
convergence of our simulations for the case of two regions
and two providers. Then, we analyze the characteristics of
this model using the numerical equilibrium solutions. While
we develop some insights into the subsidization model, we
also validate the analytical equilibrium solutions derived in
the previous section.
A. Simulation Convergence to Equilibrium
Due to complexity of the providers’ problems represented
in (22) and (29), an analytical proof for the existence of
a Nash equilibrium was deemed infeasible. However, our
extensive simulations of the game converged and were based
on best response algorithm. Therefore, we guarantee that the
simulations converge to an equilibrium. A two player game
based on the best response algorithm is designed in Matlab
for the case of two providers and two regions. During each
iteration of the algorithm,
1) Provider 1’s parameters s11, s12 and f1 are optimized
by solving the simultaneous equations (25)–(28);
2) Provider 2’s parameters s21, s22 and f2 are optimized
by solving the simultaneous equations (31)–(34);
3) The optimized parameters evaluated in the previous two
steps are used in (22) and (29) to compute the providers’
objective values.
To check for convergence, the evaluated objective values in
the current iteration are compared to their respective values
in the previous iteration. If the differences are smaller than a
threshold , convergence is attained.
TABLE II
INPUT PARAMETER SETTINGS
Parameter Value
ξ1, ξ2 262, 738
β 76
n1, n2 26, 744
γ,  0.05, 10−3
The best response simulator described above was run with
arbitrary input parameter settings as shown in Table II. With
these settings, the simulator took 93 iterations to converge.
Behavior of the system parameters and the objective functions
during the iterations are shown in Fig. 3.
The number of iterations required for convergence can vary
depending on the input parameter settings. To obtain the
statistics of the number of iterations, the simulator was run
10,000 times with random input parameters. For each run, the
input parameters β, n1 and n2 were generated using uniformly
distributed random integers, within the range of values speci-
fied in Table III for each parameter. The parameters ξ1 and ξ2
were generated such that ξ1+ ξ2 = 1000 = ξ, the total budget
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Fig. 3. The convergence to equilibrium using best response algorithm. At
beginning of the simulation, the system parameters were all set to zeros:
f1 = f2 = s11 = s12 = s21 = s22 = 0.
of the government. While ξ1 samples were generated using
uniformly distributed random integers, the corresponding ξ2
samples were calculated using ξ2 = ξ − ξ1.
TABLE III
RANGE OF INPUT PARAMETERS
Parameter Range
ξ1, ξ2 [50, 950]
β [30, 200]
n1, n2 [20, 1000]
The resulting distribution of the number of iterations is
described in Table IV. Most of the simulation runs (91.41%
of 10,000) converged within 15 iterations, while some of the
simulation runs (3.88%) took 16 to 99 iterations to converge.
The remaining 4.71% of the simulation runs took 100 or more
iterations to converge.
B. Numerical Results for Optimum Subsidy
Assume that the government has a total subsidy budget of
ξ = 1000, which has to be shared among the two providers
such that ξ1+ξ2 = ξ = 1000. Also assume that the other fixed
parameters are set according to Table V. As shown previously,
equilibrium values (s∗jk and f
∗
j ) for the simplified subsidy
model can be determined through the convergence of best
response simulations as illustrated in Fig. 3. The equilibrium
values can also be obtained by numerically solving the eight
simultaneous equations (25)–(28) and (31)–(34). However,
approximate equilibrium values can be easily obtained using
the closed form expressions (35)–(40) derived in the previ-
ous section, which also highlight the explicit dependence of
optimum subsidy and fee values on the other key parameters.
In here, we plot analytical results using the expressions (35)-
(38) for the optimum subsidy amounts (s∗jk). To validate the
accuracy of these analytical expressions, numerical solution of
TABLE IV
Iterations Number of occurrences
≤ 15 9141
16-99 388
≥ 100 471
TABLE V
FIXED PARAMETERS
Parameter Value
β 30
n1, n2 40, 80
γ 0.05
the eight simultaneous equations is also plotted in the same
graph. Under this scenario, analytical and numerical optimum
values of the providers’ objective functions are plotted with
respect to the government subsidies ξ1 and ξ2 in Fig. 4(a).
It can be seen that the objective function of a provider
increases if the government allocates higher subsidy to that
provider. Consequently, the objective function of the other
provider decreases. Therefore, the government can easily avoid
monopolization in the market by controlling the allocations of
the subsidy amount. For example, government can allocate
higher subsidy amount to small providers so that they get a
fair chance to compete with large providers. Note that the
analytical and numerical results in Fig. 4 match very closely.
Fig. 4(b) shows the optimum subsidy amounts to be spent by
the providers in each region. The optimum subsidy amounts
spent are proportional to the subsidy amounts allocated by
the government to the providers. The providers should always
spend higher amounts in the regions with higher user densities
to offer good quality of service and at the same time be more
profitable. Accordingly, in Fig. 4(b) it can be observed that
since n2 > n1, the two providers spend higher amounts (s12
and s22) in region 2 when compared to region 1. This is also
illustrated in Fig. 5, where n1 is varied from 10 to 1000 while
n2 is fixed to 80, and the government subsidies ξ1 and ξ2 are
fixed to 400 and 600, respectively. As n1 increases, both the
providers spend higher amounts in region 1 and lower amounts
in region 2. This shows that our subsidy framework will result
in a balanced investment across regions and thus avoid over-
investment into a subset of the regions.
Another point to note is, according to (35)–(38), s∗11+s
∗
12 =
ξ1 and s∗21+ s
∗
22 = ξ2. It means that a provider can maximize
its revenue only if it spends the entire subsidy amount received
from the government in the regions appropriately. The provider
cannot get maximum benefit if it spends only partial amount
of the received subsidy.
C. Numerical Results for Optimum Fee
A comparison between the analytical and numerical results
for the optimum fee are shown in Fig. 6. The optimum fee
that a provider should charge to its customers significantly
depends on the total subsidy amount ξj it receives from the
government, as shown in Fig. 6(a). If government increases
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Fig. 4. (a) Objective functions of the providers with optimum parameters;
(b) Optimum subsidy amounts spent by the providers. Objective function of
a provider increases if the government allocates more subsidy amount to that
provider. Optimum subsidy amounts are proportional to the subsidy amounts
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Fig. 5. Optimum subsidy amounts spent by the two providers versus the
number of users in region 1, and fixed number of users in region 2. It can be
noted that providers spend higher amounts in the region with more number
of users.
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Fig. 6. Optimum fee charged to users versus (a) the allocated subsidy amount;
(b) the number of calls made by a customer. Optimum fee significantly
depends on the subsidy allocated to the provider, and is proportional to β.
the subsidy amount to a provider, it enables that provider to
improve its quality of service, and hence increase the fee, and
eventually to improve its revenue. Likewise, if the government
provides higher subsidy to small operators, they will be able
to compete with large providers. As shown in Fig. 6(b), the
fee charged to a user is proportional to the number of calls
made by the customer. Here, the fee charged by provider 2 is
more than that of provider 1 because of higher subsidy amount
allocated to provider 2, that is, ξ1 = 400 and ξ2 = 600.
As mentioned in Section VII-B, the number of users in each
region n1 and n2 has very little effect on the fees charged
by the providers in each region. Accordingly, the numerical
plots of f1 and f2 in Fig. 7 are almost independent of n1 and
n2. The analytical plots which are based on the assumption
n1 = n2 = n closely match with the numerical plots.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a spectrum market where
sharing is promoted explicitly by the government. The gov-
ernment offers subsidy support to the wireless operators and
requires a performance metric to be reported. We considered
this metric to be “the number of outside customers” served by
the operator, where “outside customer” means a customer who
is not subscribed to that particular operator. This way, the oper-
ators are motivated to invest their subsidy support into regions
where likelihood of reaching and serving outside customers is
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Fig. 7. Optimum fee charged to users versus the number of users (a) in
region 1; (b) in region 2. Variations of optimum fees is negligible with respect
to n1 and n2.
higher. This, in turn, increases the aggregate coverage area and
the overall signal quality the customers receive. Both of these
end results are appealing to the government and are the main
reasons why the government should provide subsidy.
We have proposed a game-theoretic framework to model
the interactions between the government and the providers.
We have derived first-order conditions for a perfect Nash
equilibrium. We have further specialized the general problem
for a two-provider and two-region scenario. For this simplified
case, we have shown existence of such an equilibrium based
on the best response algorithm, and also derived closed form
approximations to the providers’ equilibrium conditions.
Our results have shown how the government should influ-
ence the spectrum sharing by controlling the subsidy amount
allocated to each provider. We have also studied how the
providers can distribute the received subsidy amount into dif-
ferent regions to serve maximum number of outside customers
and eventually maximize their revenues.
We have highlighted various benefits of a spectrum market
with performance-based subsidy. Such a spectrum market will
be attractive to the operators and discourage monopolization.
Further more, small providers with relatively smaller infras-
tructure can survive in this type of market and successfully
compete against large operators.
APPENDIX
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
In this appendix, closed form expressions for the optimum
fee f∗1 and f
∗
2 are derived. By applying the assumption n1 =
n2 = n in (35)–(38), we get
s∗11 = s
∗
12 = ξ1/2 ≡ s∗1, (46)
s∗21 = s
∗
22 = ξ2/2 ≡ s∗2. (47)
By substituting these two results in (22) and (29), they can be
simplified respectively as
max
f1
2f1n
1 +
γβ
√
s∗2−f2
γβ
√
s∗1−f1
+
ξ
√
s∗1√
s∗1 +
√
s∗2
− 2s∗1 (48)
s. t., f1 ≥ 0, (49)
and
max
f2
2f2n
1 +
γβ
√
s∗1−f1
γβ
√
s∗2−f2
+
ξ
√
s∗2√
s∗1 +
√
s∗2
− 2s∗2 (50)
s. t., f2 ≥ 0. (51)
Then, the first order conditions with respect to f1 and f2 can
be respectively derived to be:
(γβ
√
s∗1 − f1)2 + (γβ
√
s∗2 − f2)(γβ
√
s∗1 − 2f1) = 0, (52)
(γβ
√
s∗2 − f2)2 + (γβ
√
s∗1 − f1)(γβ
√
s∗2 − 2f2) = 0. (53)
For simplicity, substitute x = γβ
√
s∗1−f1 and y = γβ
√
s∗2−
f2 in (52) and (53) to get:
x2 + y(2x− γβ√s∗1) = 0, (54)
y2 + x(2y − γβ√s∗2) = 0. (55)
Since β, s∗1 and s
∗
2 are known, if we solve for x and y, then
f1 and f2 can be solved easily. Writing (54) and (55) in terms
of y and x respectively, we get:
y =
−x2
2x− γβ√s∗1 , (56)
x =
−y2
2y − γβ√s∗2 . (57)
By substituting (56) and (57) in (55) and (54) respectively,
and simplifying, we get:
x3 − 2γβ
(√
s∗1 − 2
√
s∗2
)
3
x2 − 4γ
2β2
√
s∗1s
∗
2
3
x
+
γ3β3s∗1
√
s∗2
3
= 0, (58)
y3 − 2γβ
(√
s∗2 − 2
√
s∗1
)
3
y2 − 4γ
2β2
√
s∗1s
∗
2
3
y
+
γ3β3s∗2
√
s∗1
3
= 0. (59)
It can be observed that (58) and (59) are 3rd order polynomials
represented in the standard form. Consider the polynomial
in (58). By substituting x = t + 2γβ(
√
s∗1 − 2
√
s∗2)/9, the
quadratic term can be eliminated and the polynomial can be
13
expressed in a more compact form as:
t3 −At−B = 0, (60)
where, A =
4γ2β2
[
9
√
s∗1s
∗
2 +
(√
s∗1 − 2
√
s∗2
)2]
27
, (61)
B =
γ3β3
272
(
16s∗1
√
s∗1 − 240s∗2
√
s∗1
− 123s∗1
√
s∗2 − 128s∗2
√
s∗2
)
. (62)
Using Viete’s method, the three real roots of (60) can be found
as follows:
t∗k = 2
√
A
3
cos
(
1
3
cos−1
√
27B2
4A3
+
(3− 2k)pi
3
)
, (63)
for k = 0,1,2. Then, the roots of x in (58) can be expressed
as:
x∗k =t
∗
k +
2γβ(
√
s∗1 − 2
√
s∗2)
9
,
=2
√
A
3
cos
(
1
3
cos−1
√
27B2
4A3
+
(3− 2k)pi
3
)
+
2γβ(
√
s∗1 − 2
√
s∗2)
9
. (64)
Finally, the roots of f1 in (52) can be expressed as
f∗1k =γβ
√
s∗1 − x∗k, (65)
=
γβ(7
√
s∗1 + 4
√
s∗2)
9
− 2
√
A
3
cos
(
1
3
cos−1
√
27B2
4A3
+
(3− 2k)pi
3
)
. (66)
Out of the three solutions f∗1k, for k = 0, 1, and 2, one
solution should be chosen which matches with the numerical
results. A comparison of the three solutions with the numerical
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Fig. 8. Solutions of f1 and comparison with numerical solution.
result is shown in Fig. 8. The solution with k = 1 matches
with the numerical solution. Therefore, the optimum fee for
provider 1 can be written as
f∗1 =
γβ(7
√
s∗1 + 4
√
s∗2)
9
− 2
√
A
3
cos
(
1
3
cos−1
√
27B2
4A3
+
pi
3
)
. (67)
Using a similar approach as described in this appendix, a
closed form expression of the solution f∗2 can also be derived
as follows:
f∗2 =
γβ(7
√
s∗2 + 4
√
s∗1)
9
− 2
√
C
3
cos
(
1
3
cos−1
√
27D2
4C3
+
pi
3
)
, (68)
where
C =
4γ2β2
[
9
√
s∗2s
∗
1 +
(√
s∗2 − 2
√
s∗1
)2]
27
, (69)
D =
γ3β3
272
(
16s∗2
√
s∗2 − 240s∗1
√
s∗2
− 123s∗2
√
s∗1 − 128s∗1
√
s∗1
)
. (70)
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